The Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) can be linked to game theory. This article shows that payoffs, or resources, in a game with alleles as players, determine the frequency of homozygotes. The frequency of aa homozygotes in the HWE is an increasing function of the multiplicative difference in own payoffs for each allele. Thus, Mendelian proportions are variable rather than fixed depending on the resources for the alleles. Whereas the concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is based on non-cooperative competitive settings such as a competition between doves and hawks, this article explores a game theoretic situation where the mating of two alleles is presupposed.
Introduction
There is an equilibrium concept that is not used by game theorists or by economists but exclusively used by biologists. The Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) is the name of this equilibrium concept [1] . The HWE explains Mendelian proportions from theoretical calculation of the allele frequencies [2, 3] . This article shows that the HWE can be linked to game theory so that game theorists and economists can reinterpret the HWE through the lens of game theory.
Maynard Smith proposed the concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) which was based on non-cooperative competitive settings such as competition between doves and hawks [4] . This article explores a situation where the mating of two alleles is presupposed. This is considered as one of cooperative games even though two alleles are influenced by the payoff structure. A basic notion of mixed strategy equilibrium in game theory [5] [6] [7] [8] is applied to reinterpret the HWE.
This article reveals that payoffs for alleles, or resources for players, determine the frequency of homozygotes. The main result of this article suggests that Mendelian proportions are variable rather than fixed depending on the resources for the alleles encountered. Although this result may not influence the academic interests of biologists because the author is not capable of reviewing the existing literature in biology, the introduction of a new equilibrium concept to the field of game theory may well develop yet unknown field of research as applications of the HWE.
An example to apply this approach in economic phenomenon is to investigate diffusion of solar panels on household roofs. We can observe a fraction of cases where a wife and a husband agree to install the solar panel. The wife and the husband have options to choose either to consume fossil energy or to install solar panels. The resources or the payoffs in this game are influenced in various ways such as a subsidy for installing solar panels, the budgets of the husband and wife, the amount of daytime sun in the region and an electric power company scheme to buy surplus electricity from the household. The couple pursues an eco-friendly life when there are large enough payoffs for their installation. Measurement of these variables in actual data is left for empirical research, however.
Section 1 shows the basic logic of the HWE. Section 2 explains how to find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium given payoffs, or resources to be utilized by each allele. Section 3 shows that the frequency of aa homozygotes in the HWE is an increasing function of the multiplicative difference in own payoffs for each allele. Section 4 discusses how we can apply the HWE notion to the third and fourth generations with different frequencies in alleles. A model in this section shows that mathematical structure of the HWE converges on the structure in the Wiener process. The concluding section sums up the major propositions.
The HWE with General Probability

Basic Model
Suppose there are two alleles: the first allele is denoted A and the second is denoted a [9] . Their frequencies are denoted by p and q resectively; ; Table 1 .
Extension of the Specifications
The ratio of the homozygotes to the hetrozygotes given in the above example is p 2 :2pq:q 2 . This result is derived only when males and females have the same ratio of two alleles in their frequencies p and q. Now, suppose males and females have different frequencies to create homozygotes and heterozygotes. Suppose further that males have the ratio of p and , and females have the frequency ratio of q and . As shown in Table 2 , the ratio of the homozygotes to the hetrozygotes is;
The HWE in a biology textbook [10] begins with a special case where p = q. Although this generalization seems to be a trivial change in the HWE model, we are now able to connect the HWE to game theory. Table 3 shows an example of payoffs. Nash equilibria: two of pure strategy and one of a mixed strategy. The equilibrium in the pure strategy is a combination of (Growth strategy, Eco strategy) and (Ecostrategy, Growth strategy). These equilibriums satisfy the definition of Nash equilibrium where a best response of a player coincides with another player's best response. I can calculate the Nash equilibrium in the mixed strategy using the probability given in 
The HWE and Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium
We see the following relationships. 
The males and the females obtain payoffs of (50, 50) respectively under the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Here we can also get 1 Table 3 . Eight payoffs in Table 3 collectively decide p and q. Mendelian proportions are not inherited but are determined by payoffs, or resources, for the alleles.
Proposition 1. The frequency of the aa homozygotes in the HWE is a function of payoffs in a game for two alleles.
I must emphasize that the symmetrical payoffs in Table 3 are not essential. I can easily show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the case where there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. What I can observe in Mendelian proportions is  as the frequency of the aa homozy infer th exis obtaining a mixe ilibrium is co
gotes and I can e tence of a game behind it. The generalization of d strategy Nash equ nsidered in the next section.
General Model with Parameters
There are eight payoffs in the game, or four payoffs for each allele. We allocate eight parameters as a payoff ma- 
We ters e, f, g and h for the payoffs for the females'
give parame case;
can calculate p and q given se parameters. AcWe the cordinration
In this article the HWE has been explained through the logic of the game theoretic optimal behavior of alleles. Howe er, questions remain as to how we understand the third and fourth generations that have different frequencies of alleles. One of the expositions of showing the aa homozygotes is shown in Figure 2 . The upper line of the tree shows an addition of the first allele A and the lower line shows the he second allel addition of t e a. The HWE is derived from the observance of the aa homozygotes.
The question is how one can find aa homozygotes in the third generation. I see that ways to obtain the H enerat t in Figure 2 . In this case, the third generation direct inherits the aa homozygotes from the second generatio e second case is to get the aa last two sequence for aa, which are depicted by rectangles in Figure 2 . We can also get the one-fourth of the frequency for the aa homozygotes among the total population. Both of the cases retain the same ratio of one-fourth in the case of the fourth generation.
The sequence is important because frequencies may differ between generations. If we assume that the top two sequences of alleles define the aa homozygotes, the fourth generation with aa homozygotes is directly inhe ed from the third generation. This frequency is one hundred percent. If the last two sequences of allele define the aa homozygotes, one half of the parental generation for the fourth generation is aa homozygotes. In the case of the top two sequences, the fourth generation shows aaAA, aaAa, aaaA and aaaa. If we check the third generation, we get aaA and aaa as the ancestors. In the case of the last two sequences, we see those cases at AAaa, Aaaa, aAaa and aaaa. The third generation for them consists of AAa, Aaa, aAa and aaa. The third generation comes from a wider range for the hetrozygotes.
We are now able to allocate the probabilities in any generations. We see that the probability of AA is pq, of Aa is , of aA is and of aa is e can also calculate from Figure 2 the at are allo the third and fourth generations.
The probability distribution in Figure 2 shows a binomial distribution. Thus we see that the mathematical structure of Figure 2 is the same as the structure in the Wiener proces e ex- and AA homozygotes. These processes seem to be similar to the emergence of mutations and the selection process of species.
